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Quantum Supremacy, Network Security
& the Legal Risk Management Framework:
Resiliency for National Security Systems
Salahudin E. Ali*
Our Sycamore [sic] processor takes about 200 seconds to
sample one instance of a quantum circuit a million times—our
benchmarks currently indicate that the equivalent task for a stateof-the-art classical supercomputer would take approximately
10,000 years.1
We want to make our defenses so good, and our architectures
so strong, that we do not care whether we are being attacked most
of the time because the attacks have no serious effects.2
I. INTRODUCTION
In late 2019, Google announced that it had achieved “Quantum
Supremacy”3—the ability for a quantum computer to solve problems exponentially faster than any existing classical computer.4 The achievement was
accomplished under the backdrop of a heated competition between great
powers in a race to achieve this feat.5 This recent development and break*

1.

2.

3.
4.

5.

Judge Advocate, USMC. LL.M., 2018, The Scalia School of Law at George
Mason University; J.D., 2011, Lewis & Clark Law School. The comments in
this Article are those of the author and are not associated with the Department
of Defense or any other government agency. All errors are his own. All sources
used herein for the purposes of this article are unclassified or declassified. The
author understands that the existence of classified sources may impact the article’s analysis.
Frank Arute et al., Quantum Supremacy Using a Programmable Superconducting Processor, 574 NATURE 505, 505–11 (2019), https://www.nature.com/arti
cles/s41586-019-1666-5.pdf.
RICHARD A. CLARKE & ROBERT K. KNAKE, THE FIFTH DOMAIN: DEFENDING
OUR COUNTRY, OUR COMPANIES, AND OURSELVES IN THE AGE OF CYBER
THREATS 14 (2019).
Id.
Salahudin Ali, Coming to a Battlefield Near You: Quantum Computing, Artificial Intelligence, & Machine Learning’s Impact of Proportionality, 18 SANTA
CLARA J. INT’L L. 1, 9 (2020) (explaining that quantum computers are those
computers that use principles of quantum physics, mechanics, and information
science for increased computational power and speed; by contrast, classical
computers use individual electronic signals and voltages, via algorithm, in limited binary states).
See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-656, CONSIDERATIONS
FOR MAINTAINING U.S. COMPETITIVENESS IN QUANTUM COMPUTING, SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY, AND OTHER POTENTIALLY TRANSFORMATIONAL RESEARCH
AREAS 1 (2018), https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/694748.pdf.
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through in quantum computing, although highly criticized,6 is something to
be applauded. For the national security community, however, such applause
may be short lived as a reminder of yet another looming cybersecurity
threat.7 Indeed, Quantum Supremacy, with its quantum computing methodology, may pose an existential threat to National Security Systems (NSSs)—
information systems that hold and manage national security data—if such
systems are ill-prepared to protect such data with what may become outdated
security standards.8
Current regimes that govern standards and frameworks for protecting
national security data may need fresh, new ideas to remain resilient and ensure appropriate decisions can be made that withstand malicious use of new
breakthroughs such as quantum supremacy’s advanced computing methodology. The current focus remains on technical mitigation of threats encouraged
by normative behavior through a risk management framework (RMF).9 This
may not be powerful enough to incentivize behavior which recognizes that
new threats are present. A question remains as to what happens after risk has
been mitigated but has simultaneously exploited a NSS. New ideas such as
providing for decision-making as a legal duty via normative behavior may
promote the concept of resiliency, the ability to absorb negative impacts to a
NSS while remaining operable, and enables a mindset to “carry-on” when
faced with such negative impacts. In other words, there is an expectation of
operating in chaos.10
The Legal Risk Management Framework (LRMF)—the collection of
public laws, statutory, and regulatory requirements mandated or adopted for
the protection of information systems by federal agencies—provides an authoritative platform for technical management of risk separate from the
RMF.11 But, as mentioned above, what may be needed is more emphasis on
6.

See, e.g., Emily Conover, Google Officially Lays Claim to Quantum
Supremacy, SCIENCENEWS (Oct. 23, 2019, 4:33 AM), https://www.science
news.org/article/google-quantum-computer-supremacy-claim; Kevin Hartnett
& Quanta, Why Two Tech Giants Are Arguing About Quantum Computers,
ATLANTIC (Oct. 24, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/
2019/10/why-google-and-ibm-are-arguing-about-quantum-computing/600625/.

7.

Scott Buchholz et al., The Realist’s Guide to Quantum Technology and National Security, DELOITTE (Feb. 6, 2020), https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/industry/public-sector/the-impact-of-quantum-technology-on-nationalsecurity.html#.

8.

Id.

9.

See DEP’T

DEF., INSTRUCTION NO. 8510.01, RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEDOD INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (IT) (2017) [hereinafter RISK
MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK].
OF

WORK FOR

10. CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 2, at 14–15.
11. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3551–3557 (2014); 40 U.S.C. § 11331 (2002); 10 U.S.C.
§§ 2223–2224a (2004); Exec. Order No. 12333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (1981);
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legal regimes which focus on and address resiliency when impacted by such
risk. This will require a change in thinking about the LRMF as an authoritative legal regime, as compared to a system of normative cybersecurity behaviors found in the RMF, as well as additions to the LRMF and the use of other
existing legal regimes to multiply its effectiveness. This proposition promotes contingency plans for information system operability. These new ideas
would become part of an authoritative legal regime. If so, solutions may be
present to combat emerging threats such as quantum computing (and a variety of other advanced computing threats), thus providing the appropriate
level of resiliency for national security systems.
This Article seeks to provide such recommendations by using quantum
supremacy as a demonstrative example to encourage development and reex-

Exec. Order No. 13587 § 5.2, 76 Fed. Reg. 63,811, 63,813 (2011); Exec. Order
No. 13636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,739 (2013); Exec. Order No. 13800 § 1(C), 82
Fed. Reg. 22,391, 22,392 (2017); OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFF. OF
THE PRESIDENT, OMB CIRCULAR NO. A-130 (2016); NAT’L INST. STANDARDS
& TECH., NIST SP 800-37 REV. 2, RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS: A SYSTEM LIFE CYCLE APPROACH
FOR SECURITY AND PRIVACY (2018); NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH., NIST
SP 800-53 REV. 4, SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS (2015); COMM. ON NAT’L SEC. SYS., CNSSP NO.
21, NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY POLICY ON ENTERPRISE ARCHITECTURE
FRAMEWORKS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEMS (2016); COMM. ON NAT’L
SEC. SYS., CNSSP NO. 25, NATIONAL POLICY FOR PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE IN NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEMS (2017); COMM. ON NAT’L SEC. SYS.,
CNSSP NO. 30, CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY PROTECTION (2017); COMM. ON NAT’L
SEC. SYS., CNSSD NO. 506, NATIONAL DIRECTIVE TO IMPLEMENT PUBLIC KEY
INFRASTRUCTURE ON SECRET NETWORKS (2019); COMM. ON NAT’L SEC. SYS.,
CNSSI NO. 1253, SECURITY CATEGORIZATION AND CONTROL SELECTION FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEMS (2014); COMM. ON NAT’L SEC. SYS., CNSSI
NO. 1300, (U) INSTRUCTION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEMS PUBLIC KEY
INFRASTRUCTURE X.509 CERTIFICATE POLICY UNDER CNSS POLICY NO. 25
(2014); for Department of Defense organizations, DEP’T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION
8500.01, CYBERSECURITY (2014) [hereinafter CYBERSECURITY]; DEP’T OF DEF.,
INSTRUCTION 8320.01, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY STANDARDS IN THE DOD
(2013); DEP’T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION 8551.01, PORTS, PROTOCOLS, AND SERVICES MANAGEMENT (PPSM) (2017); CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF
STAFF, CJCSI 6211.02D, DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS NETWORK (DISN)
RESPONSIBILITIES, at D-10–11 (2012), https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Library/Instructions/6211_02a.pdf?ver=2016-02-05-175050-653; CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION, CJCSI 6510.01F,
INFORMATION ASSURANCE (IA) AND SUPPORT TO COMPUTER NETWORK DEFENSE (CND) (2011). This list is not all-inclusive. The author realizes there are
a myriad of risk management framework regimes. The author, however, coins
the term “legal risk management framework (LRMF)” to discuss the collection
of legal regimes imposing obligations on agencies and officials to protect information systems with appropriate tactics, techniques, procedures, and qualitative
decision-making cycles.
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amination of the LRMF. Beginning with Part II, this Article provides an
overview of quantum computing, national security systems, concepts of network security, and the threats posed to current encryption standards that protect national security systems. Part III summarizes and paraphrases the
LRMF. Part IV provides a short description of the term “resiliency” as related to cybersecurity. Part V provides recommendations to assist thinking
about the LRMF and how to achieve resiliency. Lastly, Part VI offers concluding remarks. This Article is not meant to be exhaustive. It strives to encourage a conversation about how the industry can better protect national
security systems from emerging and threatening technologies.
II. QUANTUM, NETWORK SECURITY, AND NATIONAL
SECURITY SYSTEMS: DEMONSTRABLE EVIDENCE
A. Quantum Supremacy, Quantum Computing, and Classical
Computing
Quantum Supremacy is defined generally as the ability of a quantum
computer to successfully solve a problem that no classical computer can
solve.12 As related to this Article, it includes the ability to solve encryption
that no classical computer can overcome.13 Quantum Supremacy is thought
to occur once a quantum computer is able to continuously entangle fifty
qubits. Google was able to entangle fifty-three qubits. It is easy to see why
their claim to quantum supremacy carries with it a level of validity.14 The
ability to entangle these qubit promises potential uses such as machine learning,15 optimization,16 and future factoring of complex encryption algorithms
currently used for information security purposes.17 These functions will be
performed at rates far faster than classical computers.18
Stated simply, quantum computing is the process by which computers
use principles of quantum physics, mechanics, and information science for
12. Arthur Herman & Idalia Friedson, Quantum Computing: How to Address the
National Security Risk, HUDSON INST. 3, 3–9 (Aug. 2018), https://
www.quintessencelabs.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Quantum-NationalSecurity-Risk.pdf; see Ali, supra note 4, at 12.
13. Herman & Friedson, supra note 12, at 3; Ali, supra note 4, at 10–11.
14. Herman & Friedson, supra note 12, at 7.
15. See Ali, supra note 4, at 15 (discussing the ability to train artificial intelligence
through the creation of more potent algorithms by using massive datasets, adversarial competition, micromanagement, and other corrective measures).
16. See Nikolaj Moll et al., Quantum Optimization Using Variational Algorithms
on Near-Term Quantum Devices, QUANTUM SCI. & TECH. 1, 3 (July 2018). The
authors point out that ability to find the best solution to a problem from triage
of options.
17. Herman & Friedson, supra note 12, at 7–8; Ali, supra note 4, at 11.
18. Ali, supra note 4, at 7–9.
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increased computational power and speed.19 By using the underlying foundation of quantum mechanics—”information, probabilities, and observables,
and how they relate to each other”—quantum computers can perform simultaneous calculations by measuring physical photons, electrons, or atom nuclei of data.20 These simultaneous states are captured in information known
as qubits.21 Qubits are physical in nature and continuous.22 Thus, any measurement captures a value based upon a distributed probability at the time of
measurement.23 Qubits are quantum computing’s version of bits used by
classical computers, literally the “ones and zeros” [1, 0] for coding.24 They
can be harnessed in a two-dimensional forms known as superposition, where
information exists in multiple states at once by a processes of intimate correlation and connection (entanglement).25 This means that they are not limited
to binary states of coding used by classical computers (0 or 1), but instead,
can be combinations thereof (for example, [0, 1], [00], [01], [10], etc.).26 In
theory, there are infinite numbers and possibilities for these values.27
In contrast, classical computing uses binary and linear states of logic
code.28 These binary and linear states are comprised of electrons represented
by either one or zero (1, 0).29 They do not exist simultaneously.30 These binary and linear logic codes may be unsatisfying to quench today’s thirst for
more computational power and speed. The principle of “Moore’s law” dictates that binary and linear logics’ computing power doubles every year, but
eventually, these speeds will have trouble keeping up with demand.31 It appears clear how and why quantum computing is different: (1) from a techni19. Id. at 8.
20. Id.; see also SCOTT AARONSON, QUANTUM COMPUTING SINCE DEMOCRITUS 11
(2013) (“From [my] perspective, [quantum mechanics] it’s about information
and probabilities and observables, and how they relate to each other. [It] is
what you would inevitably come up with if you started with probability theory,
and then said, let’s try to generalize it so that the numbers we used to call
‘probabilities’ can be negative numbers.”).
21. Ali, supra note 4, at 8; AARONSON, supra note 20.
22. Ali, supra note 4, at 8; AARONSON, supra note 20.
23. Ali, supra note 4, at 8; AARONSON, supra note 20.
24. Ali, supra note 4, at 9.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Ali, supra note 4, at 9.
31. Id. at 10.
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cal point-of-view, it adds a new dimension to bits; and (2) it may provide the
new rates of computational power in speed to meet increasing demand.
B. National Security Systems, Encryption Standards, and Network
Security
Where these two separate computing methodologies clash is in their relation to NSSs which hold valuable information, and the encryption standards
that protect these systems. NSSs are defined by statute as:
[A]ny information system . . . used or operated by an agency or by
contractor of an agency, or other organization on behalf of an
agency [whose] function, operation, or use . . . involves intelligence activities; involves cryptologic activities related to national
security; involves command and control of military forces; involves equipment that is an integral part of a weapon system; or
. . . is critical to the direct fulfillment of military or intelligence
missions.32
It does not include systems meant for administrative or business applications such as employee payroll, finance, logistics, or personnel management.33 Given the clear and unambiguous language defined by this statutory
definition, the systems of concern here, military and intelligence systems, fit
neatly within this statutory definition.34 These NSSs are required to implement a variety of encryption standards for the protection of data they hold.35
Depending on the specific system, more stringent requirements are
warranted.
Encryption protects data held in NSSs and is defined as the process of
converting original data into a chaotic and unusable form to protect it from
unauthorized parties—it is needed because a NSS will contain the same components of basic computer networks, albeit specialized for a national security
organization.36 These components include nodes, hosts, connection protocols,
firewalls, boundary networks, workstations, servers, switches, routers, and
many other components.37 Each one of these aspects to a system permit identification, communication, and appropriate filtering of ingress and egress
32. 44 U.S.C. § 3552(b)(6)(A)-(B). The author would argue that systems that contain sensitive personnel, finance, and personnel management systems would fit
neatly in this definition, i.e. covered intelligence agents, etc.
33. Id.
34. See VALERIE C. BRANNON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45153, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: THEORIES, TOOLS, AND TRENDS 19–28 (2018), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45153.
35. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 11.
36. See J. MICHAEL STEWART, NETWORK SECURITY, FIREWALLS, AND VPNS 24–39
(2d ed. 2014).
37. Id.
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traffic within a network.38 Malicious actors take advantage of each component by using a variety of tactics, techniques, and procedures to impact confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the resources an organization pulls
from a NSS, all goals in which cybersecurity seeks to achieve.39
To date, the most secured, publicly available encryption standards for
classical computing involve uses of large mathematical operations known as
“public-key” cryptology which scrambles information until it is unlocked.40
This form of encryption is used to protect NSSs. This cryptologic process
uses a two-staged, asymmetrical protocol that splits access between parties
before information is readable by demanding large integer factoring.41 Information may not be read until one party generates a private key to decrypt
information, sends it to another party, and the receiving party uses the public
key containing the answer to the large integer.42 The public key is generally
only available to a trusted party who is authorized to factor the large integer.43 Until the large integer is factored, information remains unreadable.44
This process is extremely reliable given that classical computing attempts to
forcibly break this two-staged process could take years.45 Depending on time
constraints, this is an unreasonable length of time if one party’s intent is to
access the information to quickly gain a competitive edge.
Quantum supremacy changes this unreasonable amount of time to forcibly break the aforementioned encryption standard.46 The increased computing power and speed will dramatically reduce the time needed to factor large
integer.47 Given that qubits exist in simultaneous states, it may simultaneously generate every possible answer to a large integer, as well as alternative
answers at increasing speeds.48 What used to take years, may now take
seconds.49 This will render current encryption standards moot.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 20–39.
40. Ali, supra note 4, at 10.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 10–11.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See Keith Crane et al., Assessment of the Future Economic Impact of Quantum
Information Science, IDA SCI. & TECH. POL’Y INST. 1, 33–34 (2017), https://
www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/a/as/assessment-of-the-future-eco
nomic-impact-of-quantum-information-science/p-8567.ashx.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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One can imagine serious impacts such as an adversary accessing decades worth of intelligence information; military operational plans; covert
and clandestine operational information; or even secret personnel files.
Moreover, if combined with developing technologies and methodologies,
such as artificial intelligence50 and machine learning,51 for more rapid decision-making cycles in its employment, it is clear to see that the security implications are astounding.
C. The Importance of Understanding Network Security & the Seven
Domains of Information Technology Infrastructure
To conceptualize the issue of encryption and the impacts of Quantum
Supremacy, one must consider the concept of network security as the landscape in which these impacts occur.
Network Security can be defined as “the control of unwanted intrusion
into, use of, or damage to communications on [an] organization’s computer
network.”52 At a basic level, this includes a host of activities to include monitoring ones network for abuses and hackers, blocking unapproved transmissions, and responding to issues of operability.53 For NSSs, or any computer
system for that matter, the goal of network monitoring is to ensure the access
to resources for those privileged to use the systems while denying this access
to those unapproved to use the network.54
One starts network monitoring by determining exactly what they are
trying to protect—here, national security systems.55 This includes the physical infrastructure, the data and code that runs the system, and the people that
use the system.56 Notwithstanding particulars of a computer network, at minimum, it includes seven layers: (1) the User domain; (2) Workstation domain;
(3) Local Area Network (LAN) domain; (4) LAN-to-Wide Area Network (L-

50. See Salahudin Ali, Cybersecurity Support of Insider Threat Operations: DoD
Regulation and Constitutional Compliance, 30 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J. 1,
15–16 (2019) (mentioning that AI can generally be considered algorithmic
ability which mimics human critical thinking based on observations and decisions an agent makes to solve complex problems presented by observables).
51.

See Ali, supra note 4, at 15–16 (mentioning process by which artificial intelligence trains on massive pre-programmed data sets that are matched via algorithm through a variety of methods such as adversarial competition,
micromanagement, and other corrective measures to create better algorithms
for future decision making).

52. STEWART, supra note 36, at 4.
53.

Id.

54.

Id.

55.

Id. at 7.

56.

Id.
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WAN) domain; (5) Remote Access domain; (6) WAN domain; and (7) the
System/Application domain.57
The User domain includes people who access a computer network.58
The workstation domain includes hardware such as desktop computers,
laptops, and other devices; this layer is responsible for the transmission of
raw data.59 The LAN domain includes the hardware and software used to
support the workstation’s connectivity to the rest of the network.60 The LWAN domain refers to the interworking and interconnecting points between
the LAN and WAN network, i.e. the point of entry and departure from an
intranet and internet.61 The Remote Access domain refers to the procedures
which authenticate and authorized remote connection to an IT network.62 The
WAN domain refers to the remote locations of routers, switches, firewalls,
and other gear that provide bandwidth for connectivity; these are usually
managed by internet service providers (ISPs).63 Lastly, the System and Application Domain refers to hardware and software operating systems that
house data.64
The above assists in conceptualizing the landscape to promote a strategic philosophy of cybersecurity. End-goals of network security ensure confidentiality of resources; protecting the integrity of data; ensuring availability
of data; ensuring privacy of personal protected data; access control; effective
monitoring for violations of policy and use within a network; and ensuring
the system supports the mission of an organization.65
Trust is key in the process of network monitoring.66 It demands confidence that users will abide by appropriate user policy and rules established
by a computer network’s administrator.67 From a legal standpoint, this is
done through user agreements or other terms-of-use; from a technical standpoint, this is done through certificates that verify that a person is a trusted
(good) user of a computer network.68 A user interacts with a main server
57. Id. at 9–12.
58. STEWART, supra note 36, at 9.
59.

Id.; see also Goals of Networking, N.Y.U. COMPUT. SCI. DEP’T., https://
cs.nyu.edu/courses/spring00/V22.0480-002/class01.html (last visited Apr. 5,
2021).

60. STEWART, supra note 36, at 9.
61.

Id.

62.

Id. at 9, 10.

63.

Id.

64.

Id.

65.

Id.

66. STEWART, supra note 36, at 6–7.
67.

Id.

68.

Id.
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which vets a user’s credentials, ensuring they are who they say they are, and
gives users access (permission or privileges) to use resources within the computer network.69 The result is that confidentiality, integrity, and availability
of a computer networks resources are maintained.70
These seven domains and the security goals thereof align with the goals
of encryption (recognizing that encryption is a subcomponent of cryptology)
which are the privacy, authenticity, and integrity of data.71 As mentioned
above, encryption is a process which protects the data that is transferred
within and from the seven domains.72 It ensures, through overlapping goals,
that network security actually works.73 As related to Quantum Supremacy,
anticipation and the ability to absorb such an impact must be taken seriously.
Quantum Supremacy disrupts these goals in ways previously not
considered.74
III. THE LEGAL RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK
Requirements from a legal perspective are important to agencies and the
officials that run them. Every agency—especially head and lead officials—
should be familiar with statutory and regulatory authority that drives decision
making and action. Indeed, statutes and regulation are important because
they declare legal duties and authoritative direction, as well as impose levels
of legal sufficiency in accomplishing the overall mission.75 The LRMF
adopts standards required by federal statute, executive branch regulation, and
policy to address risks posed to its information systems.76
Language from the LRMF eventually makes its way to written policy as
underlying legal authority. For example, Department Defense Instruction
8500.01 and 8510.01 serve as the overall cybersecurity policy and lay the
framework for cybersecurity in the Department of Defense.77 The existence
of a written cybersecurity policy is important because it encapsulates the

69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Mindi McDowell, Security Tips (ST04-019): Understanding Encryption,
CYBERSECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE SEC. AGENCY, https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/
tips/ST04-019 (last modified Sept. 27, 2019).
72. Id.; see also Ali, supra note 4, at 10–11.
73. McDowell, supra note 71; Ali, supra note 4, at 10–11.
74. See supra text accompanying notes 47–52.
75. JULES COLEMAN & SCOTT SHAPIRO, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE & PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 267–68 (Jules L. Coleman et al. eds., 2002).
76. RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK, supra note 9.
77.

Id.; CYBERSECURITY, supra note 11.
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LRMF discussed above, as well as its goals.78 Written policy guides management and users toward those goals and serves a reference point for the collective of law, regulation, and organizational cybersecurity policy, ensuring a
common understanding and the availability to conduct quality assurance assessments about the success of a cybersecurity program.79
The LRMF is unique in addressing cybersecurity because networks exist
in the larger internet.80 Since its advent, the internet has primarily been a
space of norms and not legal governance.81 Originally developed simultaneously by the Department of Defense and university researchers during the
1960s through the 1980s, the internet moved toward privatization at the end
of the 20th century.82 Security was not the primary concern for this invention.83 The concept was a new, transformational way for like-minded individ-

78. See STEWART, supra note 36, at 11. To note, this is distinguishable from Technical Policy for IT. Technical Policy enforces organizational written policy
through configurational and control procedures which map to organizational
written policy. For example, a written policy may provide that a password be
“strong.” Through Technical Policy, configuration may demand that passwords
which do not include a combination of numbers, letters, and symbolisms are
not allowed. Moreover, a written organizational policy may require that personal identifiable information (PII) must be protected. The Technical Policy
will provide configuration such as a specific type of encryption and digital
signature before such information can traffic a network. Thus, through technical controls, written policy is enforced. For purposes of this Article, these
Technical Policies that enforce written policy, should be mapped to underlying
legal obligations. See Computer Security Resource Center: Technical Controls,
NAT’L INST. STANDARDS TECH., https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/Technical_Controls (last visited Apr. 5, 2021); see also The Key Difference Between
Policy vs. Procedures, COMPLIANCEBRIDGE, https://compliancebridge.com/policy-vs-procedures/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2021).
79. See STEWART, supra note 36, at 11; Computer Security Resource Center: Technical Controls, supra note 78; The Key Difference Between Policy v. Procedures, supra note 78.
80.

See STEWART, supra note 36, at 24; Computer Security Resource Center: Technical Controls, supra note 78; The Key Difference Between Policy v. Procedures, supra note 78.

81.

See Philip J. Greene, Legal Foundations of the Internet; Technical Management and Coordination; and the Standards and Protocol Setting Process and
Protocol Setting Processes; Identity and Description of Key Entities in Internet
Governance, VICTORIA UNIV. OF WELLINGTON 1 (Nov. 6, 2007), http://
old.internetnz.net.nz/issues/archive/other/governance.pdf.

82.

Id. at 2–11.

83. Ali, supra note 4, at 6 (“[C]yberspace quickly emerged as an academic and
consumer enterprise focused on the ease and efficiency of communicating information, in direct contrast to the security of information. The current model
for creating programs and applications that later fix vulnerabilities—“patch-
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uals to communicate their ideas.84 Private organizations developed sets of
rules and protocols for the internet’s working to ensure smooth communication and access to the many independent networks, creating a “web,” or more
appropriately, a “world-wide web.”85 This web of networks includes millions
of pieces of hardware, software, and individual users that are, in theory, holistically connected.86 The advent of malicious actors, however, always pacing ahead of government attempts to create regulation of the internet, quickly
took advantage of the lack of security awareness regarding national security
systems.87 Therefore, the LRMF framework for NSSs is best thought of as
addressing the very nature of the internet as a holistic threat given the
circumstances.
Collectively, the LRMF is large and nuanced. But it is possible to draw
certain overall legal requirements for agency officials. Having its origins
within legislation such as the Clinger-Cohen Act,88 Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002,89 and the Federal Information Security

ing,” a software update that temporarily fixes an existing vulnerability before
the full release of entirely new software—is ill-suited for national defense.”).
84. Id.
85. See Greene, supra note 81, at 2–11.
86. See STEWART, supra note 36, at 24.
87. Historically significant developments of malicious actors can be traced from
the 1970s until recent. Notable early developments include the “Vampire
Worm” developed by John Hupp and John Shoch of Xero’s Palo Alto Research
Center (which shut down computers at night), as well as their “Town Crier
Worm” that moved shared announcement throughout a network. Another example is offered by the US Leasing hacks tied to Kevin Mitnick in 1980 that
slowed the company’s computers and left vulgar messages. Moreover, the
MORRIS WORM offers an early example of hacking on a massive scale, exploiting vulnerabilities in UNIX code, freezing private and government computers around the United States. Lastly, SOLAR SUNRISE and MOONLIGHT
MAZE were attacks on U.S. military systems attributed to American teenagers
and Russian operatives, separately. See, e.g., JOHN P. CARLIN, DAWN OF THE
CODE WAR 79–128 (2018). Attempts have been made to address these early
hacking attempts. Legislation such as the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 10
U.S.C. § 1030, et seq.; Communication Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230;
and Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, all offer examples
of addressing hacking, intellectual property abuse and theft, and circumvention
of encryption (discussion of these legislation is beyond the scope of this
Article).
88. Clinger-Cohen Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, §§ 4001–4402,
5001–5703, 110 Stat. 186, 642–703 (1996).
89. Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347,
116 Stat. 2899, 2946 (2002).
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Modernization Act of 201490 (and many more), a framework was developed
to ensure efficient, administrative practices for procuring and implementing
information technology into government systems.91 These statutes created the
position of Chief Information Officer for federal agencies and empowered
them to advise, create, and enforce cybersecurity standards—primarily, their
responsibility is assuring the “availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, nonrepudiation, and rapid restitution of information and information
systems that are essential.”92 All elements of network security are discussed
above.93
As threats of malicious cyber activity increased, focus began to move
toward that of an operational framework, providing more discretion and decision-making capacity for military commanders within a Goldwater-Nichols
Act framework.94 This framework reorganized the chain-of-command of military organization charged with conducting warfare.95 This new framework
essentially placed cyber risk management in the hands of those who are in
contact with adversaries by recognizing that cybersecurity is part of military
operational warfare.96 This move hit its zenith with the elevation and declaration of cyberspace as an operational domain, warranting military commander
leadership in the decision-making process.97 However, the original LRMF
did not disappear. It remains in place and must be considered in the overall
IT planning framework. As with most legislation, internal regulation followed and continues to develop as new threats emerge.98
Moving the management of cyberspace to the hands of military commanders signaled a cultural shift that must be noted. As management moves
towards those who govern the operational domain of cyberspace, a mere riskadverse approach may not be appropriate. Strategically, commanders seek
authority and courses-of-action that can withstand the impact of brute-force
90. Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-283,
128 Stat. 3073 (2014).
91. See Ali, supra note 4, at 15–16; STEWART, supra note 36, at 4.
92. 10 U.S.C. §§ 2223(a)–(b), 2224(b) (2004).
93.

See supra Part II.C.

94. Memorandum from the Sec’y of Defense on the Establishment of a
Subordinate Unified U.S. Cyber Command Under U.S. Strategic Command for
Military Cyberspace Operations for Sec’ys of the Military Dep’ts (June 23,
2009), https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/secdef-cyber.pdf [hereinafter Sec’y of Defense Memorandum]; see also 10 U.S.C. §§ 161–166b, 167b (2018).
95. Sec’y of Defense Memorandum, supra note 94; 10 U.S.C. §§ 161–166b, 167b.
96. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGY FOR OPERATING IN
CYBERSPACE 5 (July 2011), https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/ISPAB/
documents/DOD-Strategy-for-Operating-in-Cyberspace.pdf.
97. Sec’y of Defense Memorandum, supra note 94; 10 U.S.C. §§ 161–166b, 167b.
98. See sources cited supra note 11.
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actions. The expectation is that systems will be used in military actions and
thus will become targets to adversaries.99 A mere risk management approach
fits an approach by agency officials charged with functionality (i.e., does the
system work?).100 The difference in nomenclature—here, “operability”—is
key. As NSSs become part of the military operational domain of cyberspace,
operability is more appropriately defined by its systems resiliency, as opposed to its initial functionality. Thus, old standards may need revision in
light of this new reality.
Risk to NSSs is managed through a set of technical policy through control measures and categorization; for example, discerning whether specific
tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) run a or High, Medium, Low risk
if implemented.101 These control measures and categorizations of risk allow
organizations to determine what risk levels are acceptable to an agency based
upon its unique mission, operational culture, and leadership philosophy. It
also allows discretion as to what mechanisms and control measures can assist
in managing such risk.102 Software, or devices that use software to connect to
national security systems, must comply with the information security standards issued and adopted by national security and intelligence agencies.
These standards include having an appropriate security screening and preauthorization by an Authorizing Official—a person authorized to approve
software and hardware for connection to a national security system.103
For NSSs, the LRMF requires that agencies develop, maintain, and implement sound, secure, and integrated information technology architecture.104
Moreover, it requires that agency officials provide information security protections for NSSs and commensurate with the risk and magnitude of harm by
complying with information standards and guidelines provided by law and
99. See, e.g., U.S. MARINE CORPS, MARINE CORPS DOCTRINAL PUBLICATION 1-3
TACTICS, at 81–88 (July 30, 1997), https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Publica
tions/MCDP%201-3%20Tactics.pdf. This maneuver warfare concept is captured in the concept of adaption, prevalent in the United States Marine Corps—
an expeditionary warfighting organization.
100. See U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Recovery Act: Standards, Interoperability, and
Cybersecurity, SMARTGRID.GOV, https://www.smartgrid.gov/recovery_act/
overview/standards_interoperability_and_cyber_security.html (last visited Apr.
6, 2021) (“Interoperability is defined as the capability of two or more networks,
systems, devices, applications, or components to share and readily use information securely and effectively with little or no inconvenience to the user.”).
101. See COMM. ON NAT’L SEC. SYS., CNSSP NO. 17, POLICY ON WIRELESS SYSTEMS (2014); COMM. ON NAT’L SEC. SYS., CNSSI NO. 1253, SECURITY CATEGORIZATION AND CONTROL SELECTION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEMS
(2014).
102. See sources cited supra note 11.
103. See 40 U.S.C. § 11331 (2002); 44 U.S.C. § 3554 (2018); 10 U.S.C.
§§ 2224–2224a (2004).
104. See sources cited supra note 11.
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Presidential direction.105 This can include certain periodic testing of the impacts of unauthorized access and disclosure of information, qualifications of
personnel who operate such a system, and implementation of automated detection systems.106 Importantly, the existing LRMF is not overly prescriptive
and leaves wide discretion to agencies and their officials, allowing a level of
flexibility. The paradox being that the LRMF may be too focused on technical aspects to accomplish requirements as to its overall intent opposed to
prescriptive requirements that require agencies and their officials to make
decisions.
Through executive order, NSSs are required to follow those standards
developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), as
implemented through several Committee on National Security System rules
and regulation, to manage agency cybersecurity risk.107 These regulations
provide that agency officials will be “held accountable for implementing risk
management measures” and for “ensuring that cybersecurity risk management process is aligned with strategic [and] operational” processes in accordance with the statute.108 Plans are expected to include strategies, operational,
and budgetary considerations that inform choices; accepted risk for unmitigated vulnerabilities; and even plans to deal with “botnets” and other automated, distributed threats.109 This is done through a process of categorizing
information systems (classified, investigative, medical information, etc.), and
then select security controls.110 For encryption, this includes the use of public-key infrastructure mentioned above and consists of asymmetrical encryption which is currently the strongest encryption for classical computing.111
105. Id.; see also Exec. Order No. 13800 §1(a), 82 Fed. Reg. 22,391, 22,392 (2017).
106. See sources cited supra note 11; see also Exec. Order No. 13800 § 1(c), 82
Fed. Reg. at 22,392.
107. See sources cited supra note 11; see also Exec. Order No. 13800 § 1(c)(2)(ii);
82 Fed. Reg. at 22,392; Exec. Order No. 13587 § 5.2; 76 C.F.R. 63, 811, 63,
813 (2011).
108. Exec. Order No. 13800 § (1)(c)(i) 82 Fed. Reg. at 22,392.
109. Id. § 2.
110. See sources cited supra note 11.
111. See NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH., NIST SP 800-37 REV. 2, RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS: A SYSTEM LIFE CYCLE APPROACH FOR SECURITY AND PRIVACY (2018); NAT’L INST.
STANDARDS & TECH., NIST SP 800-53 REV. 4, SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONTROLS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND ORGANIZATIONS (2015); CNSSP NO.
21, NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY POLICY ON ENTERPRISE ARCHITECTURE
FRAMEWORKS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEMS (2016); COMM. ON NAT’L
SEC. SYS., CNSSP NO. 25, NATIONAL POLICY FOR PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE IN NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEMS (2017); COMM. ON NAT’L SEC. SYS.,
CNSSP NO. 30, CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY PROTECTION (2017); COMM. ON NAT’L
SEC. SYS., CNSSD NO. 506, NATIONAL DIRECTIVE TO IMPLEMENT PUBLIC KEY
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What may be missing are key points in law and regulation that assume
NSSs will be compromised and the mandate that contingency plans be built
with this expectation in-mind. Instead of managing risk from a technical perspective, or as normative behavior, focus is more appropriately aimed at
managing and adapting to the impacts of such risk through broader concepts
of what makes a system resilient as a legal duty.
IV. RESILIENCY
Richard Clarke notes in his book, The Fifth Domain: Defending Our
Country, Our Companies, and Ourselves in the Age of Cyber Threats,112 that
resiliency is the “capacity of any entity . . . to prepare for disruptions, to
recover from shocks and stresses, and to adapt and grow from a disruptive
experience.”113 It is hard sought to find a better statement than that which
accurately captures this concept. The most important aspect of this concept is
not just the ability to return or withstand trauma but the ability to learn from
it through adaptation.
Resiliency, with foundations in the study of social ecological systems
(SES), requires thinking that promotes adaptability and transformability.114
Adaptability assists in adjusting to circumstances and influences outcomes.115
Transformability assists in learning to survive in a changed environment.116
This is important because SESs are thought to exist within certain critical
thresholds which allow for survivability.117 If a SES cannot cope with external drivers that cause perturbation, the critical threshold will be crossed and
make the SES too unstable for existence.118 Through resiliency, new stable
environments may be created after the initial shock of external factors, allowing for survival within a new, stable environment within the critical
threshold.119
INFRASTRUCTURE ON SECRET NETWORKS (2019); COMM. ON NAT’L SEC. SYS.,
CNSSI NO. 1253, SECURITY CATEGORIZATION AND CONTROL SELECTION FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEMS (2014); COMM. ON NAT’L SEC. SYS., CNSSI
NO. 1300, (U) INSTRUCTION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEMS PUBLIC KEY
INFRASTRUCTURE X.509 CERTIFICATE POLICY UNDER CNSS POLICY NO. 25
(2014); see also Ali, supra note 4, at 10.
112. CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 2.
113. Id. at 15.
114. See Carl Folke et al., Resilience Thinking: Integrating Resilience, Adaptability
and Transformability, 4 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 1, 2–4 (2010), http://
www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol15/iss4/art20/.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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Adaption and transformability are not to be applied narrowly nor lackadaisically. This change must be deliberate and applied more generally.120 External drivers are unpredictable (like IT environments). Thus, anticipation of
the unknown and preparation through learned behavior is key to keeping environments within critical thresholds.121 This set of thinking allows for a new
trajectory despite impacts by external factors.122 For IT networks, particularly
NSSs, this is done through a strategy defined by a written policy.123 Strategy
requires that one not only continuously seeks to reduce risk and vulnerabilities but also create processes and procedures to limit damage done to systems. Essentially, one grows from the experience through appropriate risk
management—especially when it is a requirement by law.
This concept of resiliency, and the analogy of SESs is uniquely suited
for the LRMF because managing risk involves more than mere mitigation.124
Like SESs, NSSs exist in a novel environment where external drivers can
impact them beyond their critical threshold of operability. It is not a question
whether a data system will be compromised but when it will be
compromised.
What occurs after one mitigates damage is key. Agencies and officials
need guidance. Indeed, they expect it, bureaucracy works no other way.
Some corporations have adopted this concept through policy and have flown
under the radar considering the pervasiveness of today’s cybersecurity crises
(known as the “dog that does not bark.”).125 For example, during the
“NotPetya” cyber operations in Ukraine, where many international businesses are located, many of these companies did not appear to be operationally impacted.126 Cybersecurity experts contribute this to these companies’
resiliency framework which allowed sound risk management and cybersecurity practice.127 In other words, sound cybersecurity practices allow an IT
network’s trajectory toward a new zone of stability without crossing the critical threshold of inoperability.

120. Folke et al., supra note 114, at 3.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See supra Part III.
124. See sources cited supra note 11.
125. CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 2, at 29, 33–35; see also The CyberWire Daily,
Ep 28: The Fifth Domain Coauthor Richard A. Clarke, CYBERWIRE, at 16:37
(July 21, 2019), https://www.thecyberwire.com/podcasts/cw-podcasts-special2019-the-fifth-domain-coauthor-richard-a-clarke.html.
126. CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 2, at 29. These companies included the likes of
Hyatt Hotels, Johnson & Johnson, Boeing, and John Deere, respectively.
127. Id. at 29–47.
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Those charged with creating standards for NSSs should do the same. It
is only through this mechanism that this concept of resiliency crosses the
threshold of being merely aspiration and into something more real.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
This gap can be covered with recommended additions to the LRMF.
The below recommendations are not meant to be restrictive or draconian.
Instead, the recommendations seek to change the way agencies think about
the LRMF as a legal regime considering new, advanced computing technologies—here, quantum supremacy. The below list is also not meant to be exhaustive. It may, however, start a conversation that leads to the ability to
operate NSSs on a level of continuity needed to achieve resiliency through
legal mandate.
A. LRMF Recommendations
1. Near Term Changes to Encryption Standard
The LRMF should provide that agencies maintain a plan to deal with the
impacts of quantum supremacy or other post-Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
resistant computing. For example, this could include the adoption of postquantum cryptology in the form of quantum resistant algorithms (QRAs);
quantum random-number generators (QRNGs); or lattice-based
cryptology.128 QRAs use really difficult and large integers built to withstand
impacts of quantum computer factoring.129 QRNGs use truly random numbers generated by naturally occurring randomness (measuring of solar flares,
for example).130 QRNGs may be useful to stale or prevent quantum
supremacy’s ability to overwhelm classical encryption such as PKI (NIST
has already begun this process).131 Lastly, Lattice based cryptology uses constructions of algorithmic protocols used to build cryptology by relating their
construction to proofs of extremely hard math problems.132 Through a process of spaced grids of evenly distributed but infinite number of vectors that
enable the connection of non-linear coordinates—this presents an infinite
number of possible coordinates.133 This type of encryption, if mandated by
law, provides the level of risk management to remain operable in the face of
quantum supremacy.

128. Ali, supra note 4, at 42–43.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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2. The LRMF Should Require Agencies and Agency Officials to
Continue to Engage with the Private Sector for
Expertise on Emerging Computer Threats on a
Cerebral Level Outside of the
Procurement Process
This will depend on strict compliance with current Ethics and Standards
of Practice regulation governing agencies and officials.134 The National Defense Authorization Acts of 2020135 and 2019136 provide authorizations in
U.S.C. Section 2358 of Title 10.137 Collectively, they require “the Secretary
of Defense [to] carry out a quantum information science and technology research and development program.”138 Additionally, the Secretary of Defense
must now “develop plans for reducing the risk of cybersecurity threats posed
by quantum information science technology.”139 This is accomplished by coordinating research and development cooperation with “private entities and
international entities.”140 Cooperation and coordination can be done in many
ways, but outside the procurement process, this can be accomplished through
communities of practice or a number of public-private interest groups.141 The
aforementioned acts are an encouraging sign for the LRMF in relation to
Quantum Supremacy. Although, the language should read that the Secretary
shall at least demonstrate that they have engaged with private entities and
international entities to develop plans to not only reduce risk, but to ensure
operability from the impacts of such risk: this becomes a statutory requirement for resiliency.
3. The LRMF Should Require More Stringent Standards
Applied to the Private Sector to Show Their Products
Add Value to NSSs’ Cybersecurity
Building from recommendation two, a private sector company should be
able to point directly to some sort of matrix to show how the product contributes to a control measures and security standards, and not just another layer
134. See, e.g., 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101(b); SEC’Y OF DEFENSE, DOD 5500.7-R, JOINT
ETHICS REGULATION (1993) (these regulations also adopt contract integrity
guidelines).
135. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-92,
§ 220, 133 Stat. 1198 (Dec. 20, 2019).
136. John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub.
L. 115-232, § 234, 132 Stat. 1636 (Aug. 13, 2018).
137. 10 U.S.C. § 2358 (2017).
138. See supra notes 134–137 and accompanying text.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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atop of an existing landscape.142 This can be anything from showing more
advanced forms of coding, showing the ability of agencies to modify products (like in cloud computing)143 or requiring access to lab results (failures
and successful test results).144 At this point, an agency would have total
awareness of the product they are purchasing, and the private sector would be
forced to develop products focused on their qualitative and quantitative
values.
4. The LRMF Should Require Intelligence and OperationalBased Defenses for NSSs. This is Often Captured in
Cybersecurity Nomenclature as a “Kill-Chain”
This is an expansion from many different decision-making cycles such
as Colonel Boyd’s “OODA-LOOP (observe, orient, decide, Act [repeat])”
and the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization’s process to
get “left of boom” from roadside bombs (reconnaissance, weaponization, delivery, exploitation, installation, command & control, and actions).145 The
benefit of this process is that it allows an agency to identify, detect, and stop
a malicious actor at any stage of their operation because each piece of a
malicious actor’s attack is identified.146 If a plan is developed to disrupt any
of these pieces to a decision-making cycle, a national security system may
remain resilient due to the ability to select control measures and contingency
plan for each stage of an adversary’s attack.
5. The LRMF Should Require Agencies and Their Officials to
Develop Shifting Defensive Environments
Building from the previous recommendation, constantly changing an environment may ensure an adversary who has gained access or deployed malicious code cannot maintain access to a system.147 Moreover, the adversary
142. CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 2, at 82–83.
143. Cloud computing can be defined as
[A] model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access
to a shared pool of configurable computing resources [e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services)] that can be rapidly provisioned
and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction. This cloud model promotes availability and is composed of five essential characteristics, three service models, and four deployment models.
See Peter Mell & Tim Grance, The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing,
NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH. (Sept. 2011), https://csrc.nist.gov/publica
tions/detail/sp/800-145/final.
144. See supra notes 134–137 and accompanying text.
145. CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 2, at 52–66; Ali, supra note 4, at 41 n.222.
146. CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 2, at 52–66; Ali, supra note 4, at 41 n.222.
147. CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 2, at 52–66; Ali, supra note 4, at 42.
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would be forced to think about the cost’s association with an attack, and
whether the time, effort, and expense associated with an operation offers only
a marginal benefit or something more.148 Essentially, you’ve found another
way into their kill-chain, albeit by forces of economics through a sheer technical cybersecurity practice. This promotes transformability or a new reality
given that a network has been compromised.
6. The LRMF Should Focus on Zero Trust Networks
A Zero Trust network uses an information technology model that requires a draconian process for identify verification.149 It assumes a set of
assumptions that every attempt to access the network is hostile.150 Verification is required whether a user is internal or external to a network.151 Locality
is not sufficient for access; every device, user, or traffic request must be
authenticated; written policies pull from a variety of sources via one authoritative cybersecurity theory.152
Technical practices include micro segmentation, the ability to break
apart security perimeters into smaller and manageable zones, and separation
access to parts of the network.153 These practices assist in creating a layered
defense and promoting the “kill chain” discussed above.154 It may also require multi-factor identification, for example, not only allowing access by
use of password but also requiring Public-Key authentication.155 Lastly, it
may include restricted access and limited permissive access for certain devices that connect to a network.156
Keeping the focus on Zero Trust networks assists in resiliency, as it
serves as an initial defense to malicious actors’ access to a network.157 If
mandated by law, cybersecurity may become much more achievable for
NSSs.
148. CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 2, at 52–66; Ali, supra note 4, at 34–37.
149. See Zero Trust Security, What’s a Zero Trust Network?, CLOUDFLARE https://
www.cloudflare.com/learning/security/glossary/what-is-zero-trust/ (last visited
Apr. 7, 2021); see also Evan Gilman & Doug Barth, Chapter 1 Zero Trust
Fundamentals, O’REILLY (2017), https://www.oreilly.com/library/view/zerotrust-networks/9781491962183/ch01.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2021).
150. Zero Trust Security, supra note 149; Gilman & Barth, supra note 149.
151. Zero Trust Security, supra note 149; Gilman & Barth, supra note 149.
152. Zero Trust Security, supra note 149; Gilman & Barth, supra note 149.
153. Zero Trust Security, supra note 149; Gilman & Barth, supra note 149.
154. See supra Part V.A.4.
155. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-92,
§ 220, 133 Stat. 1198 (Dec. 20, 2019).
156. Id.
157. Id.
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7. The LRMF Should Look to the Horizon for SASE Systems
SASE stands for Secure Access Service Edge.158 First described by the
research company Gartner, SASE stands for the proposition that cybersecurity can be offered as a convergence of WAN and network security services.159 SASE delivers security as a service into a single model for cloudbased systems.160 Services are based upon the identity, enterprise, security
policies, context, and a continuous assessment of risk and trust.161 This allows a level of flexibility and cost savings as cybersecurity would be encapsulated in one service through the implementation of many cybersecurity
tools.162
Given the U.S. government’s approach and enthusiasm for cloud computing models, this may be an important addition to the LRMF. Resiliency
could be achieved because it would become a more manageable information
technology portfolio, satisfying all cybersecurity products into a product that
offers the dynamics of multiple systems that are difficult to track. Given its
inherent dynamics, it would be less likely to be a single point of failure.
B. Other Areas of Law Can Lend Themselves to Assist the LRMF in
Promoting Resiliency
It may be the case that existing areas of law outside of traditional cybersecurity regimes should be included in the LRMF. There are many, but two
authorities are standouts regarding the needs of rapid technology development to protect NSSs from emerging threats such as quantum supremacy.163
1. Cooperative Research and Development Agreements
Cooperative Research and Development Agreements provided in 15
U.S.C. § 3710a and 10 U.S.C. § 2371a allows federal agencies to enter into
agreements with non-federal parties to develop technology, if the government maintains license to practice the intellectual property (IP) developed.164
This is helpful because it overcomes barriers found in the normal procure158. Matt Conran, SASE: Redefining the Network and Security Architecture (Nov.
25, 2019 10:54 AM PST), NETWORK WORLD (Nov. 25, 2019, 10:54 AM),
https://www.networkworld.com/article/3481519/sase-redefining-the-networkand-security-architecture.html; see also What is SASE?, PALO ALTO NETWORKS, CYBERPEDIA, https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/cyberpedia/what-issase (last visited Apr. 7, 2021).
159. Conran, supra note 158; What is SASE?, supra note 158.
160. Conran, supra note 158; What is SASE?, supra note 158.
161. Conran, supra note 158; What is SASE?, supra note 158.
162. Conran, supra note 158; What is SASE?, supra note 158.
163. 10 U.S.C. § 2371a (1997); 15 U.S.C. § 3710a (2000); 10 U.S.C. § 2371
(2017); 10 U.S.C. § 2371b (2019).
164. 10 U.S.C. § 2371a; 15 U.S.C. § 3710a.
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ment process, allowing high returns on investment, and more readily available operational technologies.165 Moreover, it overcomes the issue of the
federal government’s inability to own copyrights—except by transfer—by
allowing ownership of such right to the cooperative party, if such program is
considered under the ambit of copyright law.166 Defensive technologies may
be deployed without risk of public disclosure for malicious parties to take
advantage of initially.167 This occurs because, although the government maintains a license to practice the IP, it may not disclose the IP due to the nonfederal party’s ownership status. Such rapid development and deployment of
technologies may assist national security systems in obtaining defensive
technologies needed to withstand malicious actors’ attacks, thus remaining
operable.
2. For Department of Defense Organizations, the Use of Other
Transaction Authority May Assist the LRMF in
Developing Resiliency
Through the use of Other Transaction Authority,168 found in 10 U.S.C.
§ 2371 and 10 U.S.C. § 2371b, Department of Defense organizations are
165. Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) Program Overview, DEF. INFO. SYS. AGENCY, https://www.disa.mil/About/CTO/CRADAProcess-Overview (last visited Apr. 7, 2021).
166. 17 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2019). It is debatable whether aspects of computer programming are more suited under patent law. See David S. Levitt, Copyright
Protection for United States Government Computer Programs, 40 IDEA 225,
227–28 (2000).
167. Indeed, as Lucas Kello argues in an essay published in Bytes, Bombs, and
Spies, the existence of a “sovereignty gap”—private sector’s lack of confidence
in government to protect them from malicious actors, where government has
maintained the resources and legal authority alone to conduct cyber operations—is caused by new entrants into the operational cyber domain. See Lucas
Kello, 15 Privante Sector Cyber Weapons: An Adequate Response to the Sovereignty Gap?, in BYTES, BOMBS, AND SPIES 357–74 (Herbert Lin & Amy Zegart
eds., 2018). These new entrants include hacktivist, state controlled third parties,
and sophisticated cyber gangs. Id. He notes that the boundary between economic and national security domains has merged. Id. at 358. This has caused
the private sector to develop emerging technologies for its own active defense
measures employed carefully to ensure they do not breach criminal law. Id. at
358–59. Because the private sector, not subject to draconian procurement
processes of the federal government, can develop and employ emerging technologies for defensive purposes at exceeding rates, the federal government
should take advantage of this through information sharing and partnership. Id.
at 367. As related to this Article, this will promote “strategic depth” and “tactical flexibility” as defensive cybersecurity measures may outpace offensive actions by malicious actors. Id. at 362, 366–67.
168. MOSHE SCHWARTZ & HEIDI M. PETERS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45521, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE USE OF OTHER TRANSACTION AUTHORITY: BACKGROUND,
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granted the authority to use agreements (not contracts) to develop joint ventures; partnerships; consortia; or agency partnerships for advanced research
projects.169 This also includes certain prototype projects.170 Both authorities
are subject to limitations, but the important point is that, as with the proceeding recommendation, it allows an exemption from the traditional procurement process.171 Moreover, certain benefits include attracting non-traditional
contractors, which may be congruent with bridging the cultural and generational differences between the new tech community and the traditional defense industry.172 Lastly, it offers a defined mechanism to pool resources that
may not be available through federal appropriation means.173 This type of
legal mechanism may assist the LRMF in deploying technologies needed for
national security system resiliency through the use of an existing legal
regime.
VI. CONCLUSION
Broad concepts are ideal in building new frameworks or thinking about
change to any subject matter. The importance of resiliency is key to true risk
management because it offers an idealistic concept that may change the way
agencies think of cybersecurity for NSSs akin to paradigm shifting. With
emerging threats such as quantum supremacy, the concept of resiliency becomes all the more important. The LRMF mandates that agencies and officials take their responsibility seriously to conduct the mental exercise of
insuring mitigation of risk to NSSs, as opposed to existing normative regimes.174 Merely managing risk may not be enough, especially if it is narrowly focused on technical aspects of mitigation. Instead, by requiring the
ability to not only withstand the impacts of risk but also to recover and adapt
to ensure operability as a legal duty, the LRMF may provide a solution for
this ever-emerging threat and many others. The recommendations put forth in
this Article assist in such an endeavor.
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